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Do Firms Respond to Peer Disclosures? 
Evidence from Disclosures of Clinical Trial Results 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine whether a firm’s decision to disclose non-financial proprietary information 
depends on peer disclosures of similar information. Using a sample of 5,035 unique clinical 
trials by U.S. pharmaceutical firms over the 2007-2014 period, we find that the firm is less 
likely to disclose its own clinical trial results if peers have published clinical trial results 
pertaining to the same medical condition. Conditional on disclosing clinical trial results, the 
firm is also less likely to disclose the trial results on time when peers have disclosed their 
clinical trial results. Our cross-sectional tests suggest that proprietary costs of disclosure play 
an important role in the relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s own disclosure. In 
particular, the negative relation is more pronounced when proprietary costs of disclosure are 
higher. Taken together, our findings provide new evidence on the interplay between peer and 
own disclosures of non-financial proprietary information. 
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2 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the impact of peer disclosures on a firm’s decision of whether 
and when to disclose its own non-financial proprietary information. Specifically, using the 
disclosures of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms, we investigate whether peer 
disclosures of clinical trial results have an effect on the firm’s decision to disclose its own trial 
results related to the same medical condition. Conditional on disclosing the trial results, we 
also study whether the timing of the firm’s own disclosure depends on the peer disclosures.  
Disclosures of clinical trial results provide a unique setting to study the effects of peer 
disclosures on the firm’s own disclosure of non-financial proprietary information for three 
reasons. First, since 2007, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) has 
required pharmaceutical firms not only to register clinical trials but also to publish their results 
on the ClinicalTrials.gov website within one year of trial completion (e.g., Zarin et al., 2015). 
Thus, we can directly observe all registered clinical trials and use them as a benchmark to 
identify whether and when firms and their peers publish the results of the registered trials. 
Second, due to the lack of guidance on the implementation of the FDAAA (Anderson et al., 
2015) and the FDA’s reliance on the voluntary compliance of pharmaceutical firms (FDA, 
2014), only 41% of registered trial results were published over the period of 2007-2013. Only 
17% of the trial results were reported within the mandated period of one year after the trial’s 
completion (Anderson et al., 2015).1 Thus, firms have substantial discretion over whether and 
when to disclose clinical trial results, which allows us to exploit whether firms respond 
strategically to peer disclosures of similar clinical trial results. Third, the proprietary nature of 
the disclosure we examine, the highly regulated nature of the industry, and the narrowly defined 
competition at the medical condition level provide a rich setting in which to test the role of 
                                               
1 Even though the FDA can fine firms that do not comply with the disclosure rules, no fines were imposed as of 
July 10, 2014 (FDA, 2014). 
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proprietary costs of disclosure. In particular, we study how proprietary costs at the medical 
condition level affect firms’ disclosure decisions in response to peer disclosures. 
Disclosure theories suggest that a firm’s disclosure decision depends on whether other 
firms in the same industry make similar disclosures. However, the theories yield opposing 
predictions for this relation. On one hand, peer disclosures can increase the probability of the 
firm’s own disclosure. Dye and Sridhar (1995) argue that when the information endowment is 
positively correlated among the firms in the same industry, peer firms’ disclosures lead to an 
increased investor pressure on the firm to make its own disclosure. In addition, if all existing 
firms in the same industry possess the same information, peer disclosures can reduce the cost 
of disclosing proprietary information and lead to an increase in the firm’s own disclosures 
(Darrough 1993). In our setting, the probability that a firm will disclose its own clinical trial 
results would thus increase following peer disclosures. 
On the other hand, in a proprietary cost model, Verrecchia (1990) hypothesizes that the 
threshold level of disclosure increases and the probability of disclosure falls as the precision of 
common knowledge about a risky asset increases (corollaries 2 and 4, pp. 370-371, Verrecchia, 
1990).2 The intuition is that the more investors know about the risky asset from other sources, 
the less pressure they will exert on the manager to reveal private information. Peer disclosures 
of trial results not only convey relevant information about the firm’s own trial results but also 
can provide information about the competition among medical products for the same medical 
condition.3 Both increase the precision of the market’s knowledge about the firm’s future cash 
flows. Consequently, we should observe a decrease in the likelihood of the firm’s own 
disclosure as peer disclosures of trial results increase. 
                                               
2 This argument is mirrored by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), who predict that peer disclosures reduce the 
marginal benefit of the firm’s own disclosure, especially in the absence of disclosure regulation. 
3 See, e.g., “Melanoma trial failure deals heavy blow to immunotherapy hopes” (Financial Times, 2018). 
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To test these competing predictions, we use a sample of 5,035 unique clinical trial result 
disclosures (or non-disclosures) for clinical trials registered on ClinicalTrials.gov by 305 U.S.-
listed pharmaceutical firms over the period of 2007-20144. Holding the medical condition 
related to the firm’s and peers’ clinical trials constant, we examine whether a firm’s own 
disclosure decision regarding a clinical trial result is a function of the number of trial result 
disclosures provided by its peers.  
We find strong evidence that a firm is less likely to disclose its own clinical trial results if 
a higher number of peers have provided results about trials for the same medical condition 
during the past year. Furthermore, conditional on disclosing clinical trial results, the firm is 
also less likely to disclose its results on time if many peers have disclosed their clinical trial 
results. These results hold after we control for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Our 
findings are thus consistent with the argument that peer disclosures increase the precision of 
the common knowledge about the firm’s own trials and reduce the benefits of the firm’s own 
disclosure. Consequently, the firm is less likely to disclose the results of similar trials. 
Conditional on disclosing the results, the firm is also less likely to disclose them on time. 
To attempt to draw a causal relation between peer disclosures and a firm’s own disclosures, 
we exploit arguably exogenous shocks to peer disclosures at the clinical trial level. Specifically, 
we identify peer firms that committed to disclosing all clinical trial results on ClinicalTrials.gov 
within one year of the trial completion. We then use these firms’ batch disclosures of clinical 
trial results (i.e., more than five clinical trial results related to different medical conditions 
disclosed by one single firm) on a single day as shocks to peer disclosures of trial results for a 
given medical condition. The intuition is that these firms’ commitment to comply with the 
FDAAA and their subsequent batch disclosures to fulfill this commitment are likely to be 
                                               
4 The sample contains 5,297 trial-firm observations, as some clinical trials are co-conducted by more than one 
firm. 
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driven by firm characteristics rather than the characteristics of a single clinical trial.5 Thus, 
batch disclosures of clinical trial results by these committed firms provide plausibly exogenous 
variations to the disclosures of clinical trials pertaining to the same medical conditions 
conducted by non-committed firms. Our results using the exogenous shock corroborate our 
main findings. 
Next, we aim to understand whether the firm’s disclosure decisions in response to peer 
disclosures vary with proprietary costs of disclosure. To do so, we take advantage of unique 
trial characteristics. First, we use peer disclosures of completed trials and trials in later phases 
as proxies for proprietary costs of disclosure. Peer disclosures of results related to completed 
and later-stage trials signal that peers are close to obtaining FDA approval and commercializing 
medical products, which increases the competition among existing firms that conduct clinical 
trials pertaining to the same medical condition. Consequently, the competition among existing 
rivalries increases the proprietary costs of disclosure for the firm and decreases the likelihood 
of the firm’s disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983; Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997). In addition, 
compared to the content of incomplete and early-stage trial results, the content of peers’ 
completed and advanced phase trial results increases the precision with which the value of the 
firm can be estimated, thereby further reducing the probability of the firm’s own disclosure 
(Verrecchia, 1990). Consistent with our expectation, we find that the negative relation between 
the likelihood and timeliness of the firm’s own disclosure and the number of peer disclosures 
is driven mainly by peer disclosures that involve the results of completed trials or trials in 
advanced phases. Second, we construct a trial concentration measure based on the normalized 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of clinical trials related to the same medical condition, 
which we use as a proxy for the firm’s proprietary costs of disclosure. Consistent with our 
expectation, the negative association between peer disclosures and the likelihood and 
                                               
5 A particular clinical trial is usually related to a unique medical condition. 
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timeliness of the firm’s own disclosures is stronger when competition within the same medical 
condition is higher. 
Finally, we explore whether the negative relation between the firm’s own disclosure 
decisions and the number of peer disclosures depends on the nature of peer disclosures. We 
capture the nature of peer disclosures using the combined market reaction of the firm and its 
peers to peer disclosures. We then interact the number of peer disclosures with an indicator for 
a negative market reaction. We find evidence that the firm is more likely to disclose its own 
trial results if the market reaction to peer disclosures is negative. This finding is consistent with 
that of Acharya et al. (2011), who argue that bad market-wide news leads to the clustering of 
disclosures. 
Our paper contributes to the disclosure literature in at least three ways. First, broadly 
speaking, we add to the disclosure literature by providing evidence on how firms make 
disclosure decisions regarding non-financial proprietary information. Most of the disclosure 
literature examines the costs and benefits that firms face in the disclosure of financial 
information such as management forecasts. We take a different approach and investigate the 
firms’ disclosure decisions about non-financial proprietary information. Non-financial 
proprietary information is important to firms because such information can directly affect the 
competition dynamic in a given industry and thereby affect firms’ future cash flows. For 
example, Krieger (2017) shows that the news about peer firms’ drug development failures has 
a significant impact on pharmaceutical firms’ R&D investments. 
Second, we add to the recent literature that examines the interrelationship of disclosures 
among firms. For example, Baginski and Hinson (2016) find that there is a negative relation 
between peer disclosures and a firm’s own disclosure. Specifically, they show that when some 
firms stop issuing quarterly management forecasts, other non-forecasting firms in the same 
industries in turn increase their quarterly forecasts. Breuer et al. (2018) also document that 
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mandating some firms’ disclosures has a negative effect on other firms’ incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosures. 6 Seo (2017), however, finds the opposite result and shows that the more 
peer firms provide management forecasts, the more the firm is compelled to make similar 
forecasts. Therefore, the evidence on whether and how peer disclosures affect the firm’s own 
disclosure is mixed. Using the disclosure of clinical trial results, we take advantage of within-
firm variation in firms’ disclosure at the product level. This rich setting also allows us to 
explore the role of proprietary costs of disclosure in how firms strategically respond to peer 
disclosures. 
Finally, we add to the literature that investigates the timing of disclosure. Prior studies 
document a clustering of disclosure – in particular bad news disclosure – among firms, i.e., a 
positive relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s own disclosure. For example, Tse and 
Tucker (2010) show that firms tend to time the release of their earnings warnings shortly after 
peer firms’ warnings in an effort to redirect attention from the disappointing earnings 
performance to the poor market condition. In contrast, we find that firms tend to delay the 
disclosure of clinical trial results if a number of peers have already provided similar 
disclosures. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional 
background. In Section 3, we discuss related literature and develop our hypotheses. We present 
our data, sample selection, and research design in Section 4. We discuss our results in Section 
5 and provide cross-sectional analyses in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. 
2. Institutional background  
                                               
6 The setting of Breuer et al. (2018) differs from ours in that they examine the impact of mandating some firms’ 
disclosures on the voluntary disclosure behaviour of other firms. In their study, the firms are subject to different 
disclosure regimes, which allows them to study the spillover effect of regulation. In contrast, in our study, firms 
in the same industry face similar disclosure regimes and choices, which allows us to investigate how firms 
strategically take into account each other’s disclosure policies. 
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The pharmaceutical industry is closely linked to the health care sector, which represents 
one-fifth of the U.S. economy (Thakor and Lo, 2015). In recent years, the pharmaceutical 
industry has become more and more competitive as a result of fast technology advancements 
and expiration of drug patents. The highly competitive nature of the pharmaceutical industry 
forces firms to compete on the clinical trial level pertaining to a medical condition. However, 
pharmaceutical firms make little disclosure related to their clinical trials (The Economist, 2015).  
The registration of clinical trials and the publishing of the trial results can lead to more 
information sharing with potential trial participants, reduced publication bias against 
unsuccessful trials, and increased investor awareness of ongoing clinical trials conducted by 
pharmaceutical firms. In 1997, the U.S. passed its first law requiring pharmaceutical firms to 
register the efficacy trials of investigational new drugs for serious or life-threatening disease 
conditions and interventions (Zarin et al., 2015). The 1997 law resulted in the launch of 
ClinicalTrials.gov, which is a publicly accessible website operated by the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) to host the registration of studies on the above-mentioned diseases. Although 
the 1997 law made it easier for the public to know whether a trial related to a serious disease 
exists, its scope is limited and trial results are scarce. 
In an effort to expand the registration of the types of clinical trials and the reporting of trial 
results, the U.S. passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA, Public 
Law 110-85, 110th Congress) in 2007. The FDAAA requires pharmaceutical firms to register 
all post-Phase 1 trials that involve clinical investigation of drugs, biological products, and 
devices on ClinicalTrials.gov. Furthermore, the firms are required to publish the results of the 
registered trials within one year of the trial completion date. The 2007 FDAAA has a much 
broader scope than the 1997 law, since the FDAAA mandates the registration of research on a 
wider set of diseases and the publication of clinical trial results.  
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Nevertheless, while virtually all clinical trials are registered on ClinicalTrials.gov, the 
compliance rate for the publication of clinical trial results is relatively low. For example, 
Anderson et al. (2015) find that less than half of the registered trial results were disclosed over 
the period of 2007-2013. The compliance rate is low for a few reasons. First, although the 
FDAAA specifies that the failure to comply with the law can lead to potential civil monetary 
penalties and/or withholding of federal grant funds, the FDA has never penalized firms that do 
not comply with the FDAAA requirements (FDA, 2014; The Economist, 2015; Zarin et al., 
2015). 7  Second, the FDA relies on pharmaceutical firms’ voluntary compliance with the 
FDAAA. For example, in the response letter to Congressman Lance dated July 10, 2014 (FDA, 
2014), the FDA states that it “has been able to achieve voluntary compliance in certain cases 
where we have identified apparent noncompliance and brought that to the attention of the 
responsible party.” Third, the FDAAA lacked implementation guidelines. Although the 
publication of clinical trial results was mandated in 2007, the corresponding guidelines (i.e., 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for FDAAA) were not released until November 
2014. In fact, the public comment period for the guidelines did not end until March 2015 (see, 
e.g., Zarin et al., 2015 for more details). In the end, to clarify the reporting responsibilities 
under the FDAAA and improve the compliance rate, the FDA drafted another rule (the Final 
Rule for Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission (42 CFR Part 11)), 
which took effect on January 18, 2017. 
Therefore, the FDA’s low enforcement, reliance on voluntary compliance, and lack of 
implementation guidance for the FDAAA left pharmaceutical firms with a choice of whether 
or not to submit their clinical trial results to ClinicalTrials.gov, and whether or not to submit 
them on time. While firms may voluntarily disclose clinical trial results via other channels (e.g., 
                                               
7 According to the FDA’s response letter to Congressman Lance (dated July 10, 2014), “To date, there have been 
no civil monetary penalties assessed for noncompliance with the requirements of section 801 of FDAAA.”  
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8-Ks, 10-Ks, and press releases), to the extent that pharmaceutical firms have the obligation to 
disclose under the FDAAA, we expect the disclosure to ClinicalTrials.gov to be the most 
relevant channel of clinical trial result disclosures.8 Thus, we focus on pharmaceutical firms’ 
disclosure discretion under the FDAAA over the period of 2007-2014 and investigate whether 
a particular firm’s disclosure of clinical trial results on ClinicalTrials.gov depends on peer 
disclosures.9 
Pharmaceutical firms also vary in their level of commitment to the disclosure of clinical 
trial results. Some firms publicly commit to disclose all clinical trial results within one year of 
the trial completion in full compliance with the FDAAA. We identify two such firms, 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Novartis. GSK announced its support for full disclosure of 
clinical trial results via press releases (GSK, 2013 February) since May 2013, while Novartis 
made the full disclosure commitment through its website since 2009.10 Other firms vary in their 
level of compliance, ranging from never publishing any results to publishing clinical trial 
results on a case-by-case basis. In addition, firms exhibit differences in the way they publish 
the clinical trial results. Some firms publish the results of clinical trials one by one, while others 
prefer to disclose the results of several clinical trials at the same time. In our sample, we identify 
24 eligible occurrences of firms disclosing five or more clinical trials results on the same day 
(i.e., batch disclosures)11. Of the 24 batch disclosures, three were made by GSK and three by 
Novartis. To the extent that the decision to make these batch disclosures is driven by GSK’s 
                                               
8 Consistent with this argument, in Table 3, we document a strong market reaction to the firm’s own disclosures 
as well as peer disclosures related to clinical trial results on ClinicalTrials.gov. This evidence suggests that 
investors consider ClinicalTrials.gov as an important source of clinical trial information. 
9 Enache, Li and Riedl (2018) examine how the type of news affects biotech firms’ product-level voluntary 
disclosure in 10-K filings. Conceptually, we differ from their study by investigating the impact of peer disclosures 
on firms’ product-level disclosures. Empirically, our study is also different from theirs since we focus on 
pharmaceutical firms’ disclosures on ClinicalTrials.gov, which is the designated disclosure channel pertaining to 
clinical trials.  
10 https://www.novartis.com/sites/www.novartis.com/files/leaders-in-clinical-trial-data-transparency.pdf 
11 24 eligible occurrences of batch disclosures happened before March 2014, our time limit for clinical trial 
completion date. 
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and Novartis’s commitment to comply with the FDAAA, these six batch disclosures are 
plausibly exogenous shocks to peer disclosures at the clinical trial level, with respect to firms 
that have not committed to disclose.12 Thus, we use the six batch disclosures provided by GSK 
and Novartis as a quasi-experiment to attempt to identify the causal relation between peer 
disclosures and a firm’s own disclosure decisions regarding a particular clinical trial for the 
same medical condition. 
3. Hypothesis development 
Firms trade off benefits and costs when making disclosure decisions (e.g., Beyer et al., 
2010; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). The benefits of disclosure include 
capital market benefits such as reducing information asymmetry, increasing stock liquidity, 
and decreasing the cost of capital. The costs of disclosure include direct costs (e.g., Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016), litigation costs (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997), and proprietary costs (e.g., Li, 
2010; Li, 2013). While most of the prior studies focus on the influence of firm or manager 
characteristics on the firm’s disclosure decisions, a growing body of research investigates the 
role of peer disclosures in shaping the firm’s own disclosure decisions. We use the disclosure 
of clinical trial results and examine whether the firm’s decisions to disclose clinical trial results 
depend on its peers’ disclosures of trial results related to the same medical condition. 
It is unclear ex ante whether peer disclosures will increase or decrease the probability of a 
firm’s own disclosures of clinical trial results. On one hand, Dye and Sridhar (1995) 
demonstrate that when the information endowment is positively correlated among firms in the 
same industry, other firms’ disclosures will exert pressure on the firm itself and trigger its own 
disclosure. The intuition is that when investors observe peer disclosures, they infer that the firm 
                                               
12 The other 18 batch disclosures were made by 13 firms that did not make an explicit commitment to publishing 
clinical trial results one year from trial completion or state that the results would be made available after the 
product is marketed. Those firms are Affymax, Allergan, Astrazeneca, Colgate-Palmolive, Eli Lilly, Forest 
Laboratories, Pacira, Pfizer, Regeneron, Sanofi, Teva, Vertex and Vivus. 
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has similar information. If the firm does not disclose, it implies that the firm is withholding bad 
news, and investors may discount its share price. Therefore, the firm has no choice but to 
disclose its information. Consistent with this argument, Seo (2017) documents a positive 
association between the frequency of peer-firm management forecasts and the frequency of the 
firm’s own management forecasts. Such a positive association may be pronounced in our 
setting, where pharmaceutical firms were under pressure to disclose more details about their 
clinical trials even before the introduction of FDAAA 2007 (Anderson et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, peer disclosures can also reduce the costs of disclosing proprietary 
information, in particular if all existing firms in the same industry possess such information 
(e.g., Darrough, 1993). If so, when peers disclose the proprietary information, it lowers the 
firm’s threshold of disclosure and prompts it to make a similar disclosure. In our setting, the 
firm is more likely to publish the clinical trial results if a number of peers have already 
published trial results related to the same medical condition. 
On the other hand, peer disclosures can have a deterrence effect on a firm’s own disclosure. 
Verrecchia (1990) posits that a firm is less likely to disclose its own information if the market 
already has high-quality information about a risky asset. The intuition is that the more investors 
know about the risky asset, the less pressure they will put on the manager to reveal private 
information. Similarly, assuming firms’ cash flows are correlated, Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2000) predict that peer disclosures can reduce the marginal benefit of the firm’s own 
disclosure, leading to a low level of firm disclosure. Consistent with this argument, Breuer et 
al. (2018) find that mandatory financial disclosures of some German firms reduce the voluntary 
disclosures of other German firms due to the spillover information benefits. Baginski and 
Hinson (2016) demonstrate that when some previously committed firms stop providing 
management forecasts, other firms in the same industry start to provide such forecasts. Their 
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findings suggest that the latter group of firms were originally free riding on their peers’ 
provision of information to the capital market via management forecasts.  
To the extent that peer disclosures of clinical trial results increase the precision of common 
knowledge about the results of the trials related to the same medical condition and reduce the 
marginal benefits of the firm’s own disclosure, we should observe a decreased likelihood of 
the firm’s own disclosure. 
Given the competing theoretical predictions and mixed empirical evidence on peer 
disclosure, we make no directional prediction on the relation between peer disclosures and the 
firm’s own disclosure of clinical trial results: 
H1: A firm’s likelihood of disclosing a clinical trial result is related to peer disclosures of 
clinical trial results pertaining to the same medical condition. 
Conditional on disclosing clinical trial results, firms also have flexibility regarding the 
timing of disclosure. For example, using a dynamic disclosure model, Acharya et al. (2011) 
posit that firms strategically choose the timing of information releases, which leads to the 
clustering of disclosures around bad market news. The intuition is that firms tend to release 
good news upon its arrival, whereas they tend to delay releasing bad news until the negative 
market condition unfolds. Tse and Tucker (2010) find consistent empirical evidence that firms 
accelerate their earnings warnings soon after peer firms issue earnings warnings. They argue 
that firms strategically choose to disclose bad news together with other firms so the labor 
market will not blame the manager for poor earnings performance. Guttman et al. (2014), on 
the other hand, theoretically demonstrate that information releases in one period delay 
disclosures in the subsequent periods. The intuition is that firms have incentives to delay the 
disclosure of proprietary information in order to maximize their share price. In our setting, we 
thus hypothesize that: 
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H2: A firm’s timeliness of disclosing a clinical trial result is related to peer disclosures of 
clinical trial results pertaining to the same medical condition. 
4. Data and research design 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
To create a sample of firms’ own disclosures of clinical trial results under the FDAAA, we 
start with the Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov (AACT) database obtained through the 
Clinical Trials Transformation Initiative (CTTI) website. CTTI aggregates and restructures 
data downloaded from ClinicalTrials.gov to facilitate the analysis of a complete set of trials. 
We follow Anderson et al. (2015) to identify the clinical trials subject to the FDAAA 
requirement regarding the publication of trial results. Specifically, we start with all clinical 
trials for which there is information on sponsors, registered countries, oversight authority, 
intervention type, and recruitment status. Since we study firms’ decisions to publish clinical 
trial results, we keep only those trials that are funded or sponsored by firms and exclude trials 
sponsored or funded solely by universities, research institutions or the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). As the FDAAA only requires the disclosure of interventional clinical trials, we 
eliminate observational studies or expanded access trials and retain only interventional clinical 
trials. We also exclude clinical trials in Phase 0 or Phase 1 and trials that have not completed 
patient recruiting or have been terminated, as the FDAAA does not require these trials to report 
results (Anderson et al., 2015). Next, we limit our clinical trial sample to those whose primary 
completion date is between November 2007 and March 2014, those conducted in the U.S., and 
those conducted abroad with FDA authorization. Our sample period starts immediately after 
the FDAAA in November 2007 and ends in March 2014, which is one year before our 
downloaded data date of March 27, 2015. We choose the sample period ending time of one 
year before the downloaded data date because the statutory lag for publishing a completed trial 
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is one year. To allow enough time for all trials to publish their results, we also run a robustness 
check with 2007-2012 as our sample period. Our results remain unchanged.  
We focus on clinical trials of following types of interventions: biological, drug, device, 
generic, and radiation. We keep clinical trials whose sponsor or collaborator is a publicly traded 
firm or a subsidiary of a publicly traded company with the necessary financial information 
available in Compustat and CRSP. We merge AACT and Compustat datasets manually by 
sponsor and company name. If the sponsor for a clinical trial in the AACT dataset is not a 
publicly traded firm, we match that sponsor manually with its publicly traded parent company 
at the date of the trial result disclosure. Finally, we exclude the clinical trials of 
GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis, which we treat as exogenous disclosure events, to rule out the 
confounding effects of the commitment to disclosure. The final sample consists of 5,297 
clinical trial-firm observations (5,035 unique trials) funded by 305 firms over the sample period 
of 2007-2014 (252 clinical trials have multiple firm sponsors). The earliest clinical trial was 
completed on December 31, 2007. The earliest due date was December 31, 2008, and the 
earliest result was disclosed on September 26, 2008. The latest clinical trial was completed on 
March 31, 2014. The latest due date was December 19, 2015, and the latest result was disclosed 
on July 3, 2015. Table 1 provides an overview of the sample selection process. 
To create a sample of peer disclosures, we use all clinical trial result disclosures related to 
the same medical condition published by other firms, universities, NIH, or any research 
institutions, within one year before the firm’s own reporting due date.13, 14 We identify the 
clinical trials related to the same medical condition as those with the same Medical Subject 
                                               
13 Our results are robust to defining the disclosure window as 180 days prior to the due date. 
14 We use the clinical trial result due date as the cut-off point to define the 365-day window for all the trials (both 
disclosed and non-disclosed). In untabulated results, we also run two robustness tests. In the first test, we use the 
trial result due date as the cut-off point for undisclosed trials, while we use the result submission date for early 
disclosed trials and the result due date for late disclosed trials. In the second test, we use the trial result due date 
for undisclosed trials, while we use the result submission date for all disclosed trials. Our results remain largely 
unchanged. 
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Heading (MeSH). These headings are created by the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) 
to index journal articles and books in the health sciences, and the ClinicalTrials.gov website 
uses MeSH to classify the type of medical condition studied in clinical trials. When a clinical 
trial is associated with several MeSH conditions, we use the MeSH condition that yields the 
highest number of competing trials to capture the most relevant MeSH medical condition.15 
Note that we treat disclosures by other firms, universities, NIH, or research institutions as peer 
disclosures because they all arguably drive the firm’s decision to publish its trial results. This 
yields a pool of 77,181 clinical trials from which we identify clinical trials conducted and 
disclosed by peers.  
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. Many firms do not comply with the submission 
requirements of the FDAAA. In our sample, only 57.7% clinical trials results are disclosed. Of 
these, only 52.0% of clinical trial results are disclosed within the 12-month period following 
the completion of a trial. These statistics are slightly higher than those of Anderson et al. (2015), 
who find that only 41.5% of clinical trials results were reported over the sample period of 2007-
2013. 
The mean (median) number of peer disclosures is 19.85 (12), while the mean (median) 
number of a firm’s own past disclosures pertaining to the same medical condition is 1.40 (0). 
On average, 16.30 peer clinical trial disclosures have complete results during the one-year 
disclosure period before the trial due date, while 3.53 have incomplete results. 10.63 peer trial 
disclosures are in a late phase (i.e., after Phase 2), while 9.34 peer disclosures are in an early 
phase (i.e., in Phase 0, 1, or 2).  
                                               
15 In untabulated robustness checks, we use the average number of disclosures across all MeSH conditions in the 
trial. We also code Peer Disclosures as a binary variable equal to one if the number of peer disclosures is above 
the median, and zero otherwise. Both tests yield unchanged results. 
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The firms in our sample are large pharmaceutical companies. Their mean and median 
market value of equity is $78.6 billion and $64.1 billion (untabulated), respectively. The mean 
and median of their book-to-market ratios are 0.491 and 0.491, respectively. The mean (median) 
ROA is -0.5% (7.5%), and 18.2% of the observations have negative net income in the year 
prior to the due date of the clinical trial results. The average institutional ownership is 43%. 
Finally, about 12 analysts follow each firm in our sample. 
Most clinical trials (82.4%) in our sample have complete results. In 71.2% of the trials, the 
firm is the lead sponsor. On average, 1.64 collaborators participate in a clinical trial, 75.8% of 
clinical trials are funded solely by the industry, and 84.4% are under FDA oversight or 
jurisdiction. The average Phase is 2.6, which is slightly above Phase 2, the minimum phase 
requirement of the FDAAA statutory disclosure. The mean (median) of normalized trial HHI 
is 0.32 (0.13), which suggests a high concentration and a less competitive market at the clinical 
trial medical condition level. Finally, 48% of the clinical trials received positive market 
reactions over the three-day window (-1, +1) around the disclosure date of trial results. 
In addition, in our sample, 59 firms always disclose their clinical trial results over the 2007-
2014 sample period (untabulated). These firms disclose 125 clinical trials results, which 
accounts for 2.36% of our sample. 123 firms never disclose their clinical trial results over our 
sample period, which corresponds to 308 clinical trial-firm observations and 5.81% of our 
sample. Most firms in these two subsamples conduct one or two clinical trials. The majority of 
our sample (91.83%) is composed of 4,864 clinical trial-firm observations by another 123 firms, 
which disclose some but not all of their clinical trial results. This suggests that the disclosure 
of clinical trial results is not always determined by firm-level characteristics but can also be 
driven by clinical trial-level characteristics. In untabulated results, we exclude from our sample 
the 433 trial-firm observations pertaining to 182 firms that always or never disclose clinical 
trial results during our sample period. Our results remain unchanged.  
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4.3. Research design 
To examine the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s own disclosure decisions, we estimate 
two regression models. In Model 1, we test for the association between peer disclosures and 
the firm’s decision to report its own clinical trial results. In Model 2, for the subsample of firms 
that have disclosed their own clinical trial results, we test for the association between peer 
disclosures and the firm’s decision to report clinical trial results on time. Our models are as 
follows: 
Model 1: 
Disclosure = β0 + β1 · Peer Disclosures + ∑ n · Firm-Level Controls  
+ ∑ n · Clinical Trial-Level Controls + Year Fixed Effects + Firm Fixed Effects  
+ ε.          (1) 
Model 2: 
Timely Disclosure = β0 + β1 · Peer Disclosures + ∑ n · Firm-Level Controls  
+ ∑ n · Clinical Trial-Level Controls + n+1 · Current Own CAR (-1, +1) 
+ Year Fixed Effects + Firm Fixed Effects + ε.   (2) 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the binary variable Disclosure, which equals one if 
the clinical trial results are disclosed by a firm, and zero otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent 
variable is the binary variable Timely Disclosure, which equals one if the clinical trial results 
are submitted by the firm before or on the due date mandated by the FDAAA, and zero 
otherwise.16 Since the dependent variables are discrete variables, we use both OLS and probit 
estimation in the analyses. We estimate our probit models without firm fixed effects to avoid 
the incidental parameter problem (Greene, 2004). 
Our main independent variable of interest, Peer Disclosures, is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of clinical trial result disclosures related to the same medical condition, 
published by other firms, universities, NIH, or any research institutions within the one year 
                                               
16 Clinical trial results should be submitted no later than one year after the trial completion date. However, the 
submissions can be delayed for up to two additional years if the manufacturer certifies that the FDA’s approval 
to market the studied product is or will be sought within one year (see Zarin et al., 2015; FDAAA and Public Law 
110–85—Sept. 27, 2007 121 Stat. 913, Section 801). 
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preceding the firm’s own reporting due date. Thus, Peer Disclosures captures the recent 
disclosures provided by the firm’s peers at the clinical trial level. We use the number of peer 
disclosures instead of an indicator for the existence of any peer disclosures for the following 
reason: Investors’ perception that some peer firms have information can affect the probability 
of the firm’s own disclosure only if there is a sufficient number of peer disclosures (Dye and 
Sridhar, 1995).17 
We control for a set of firm characteristics known to be related to firms’ disclosure 
decisions. For example, we use Market Capitalization, defined as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity at the fiscal year end prior to the due date of the clinical trial results, to 
proxy for firm size (Frankel et al., 1995; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
Larger firms face higher regulatory scrutiny and are thus more likely to disclose clinical trial 
results on time. We also include book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the fiscal year prior to the result due date, to capture 
firms’ incentives to communicate private information to the public (Graham et al., 2005; 
Waymire, 1985). In addition, we control for stock return volatility, stock return, return on assets 
(ROA), and a loss indicator (Loss) to take into account the influence of firm performance over 
disclosure decisions (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Lennox and Park, 2006; Miller, 2002). Finally, we 
add Institutional Ownership (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and Analyst 
Following (Baginski and Hassell, 1997) to account for information demand from institutional 
investors and analysts. We provide detailed definitions of these variables in the Appendix A. 
We also include various clinical trial characteristics that may affect the disclosure decisions 
in the regressions. For example, we control for whether clinical trial results are complete at the 
time of disclosure. Complete Results is a binary variable that equals one if clinical trial 
                                               
17 Consistent with this argument, our results are also robust to defining peer disclosures as an indicator based on 
the sample median. 
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recruitment is completed at the time of disclosure, and zero if clinical trial recruitment is other 
than completed. We also add the clinical trial phase (Phase), which is an ordinal variable that 
represents the current phase of the clinical trial. Phase 4 is the most advanced phase, after which 
the FDA will approve or reject the clinical trial results. Since the FDA only requires the 
disclosure of clinical trial results beyond Phase 1, Phase takes the values of two, three, and 
four in the main analysis. According to Anderson et al. (2015), funding source and authority 
oversight may also affect the firm’s disclosure decisions. Hence, we control for Industry 
Funding Source and FDA Oversight in the regressions. Industry Funding Source is a binary 
variable equal to one if the clinical trial is funded only by industry (i.e., not by universities, 
NIH or other research institutions), and zero otherwise. FDA Oversight is a binary variable 
equal to one if the clinical trial is under the FDA authority or jurisdiction, and zero otherwise. 
For certain clinical trials, more than one firm may participate in the same trial. Therefore, we 
include the number of collaborators (Number of Sponsors) and whether the firm is the lead 
sponsor (Lead Sponsor). 
Firms may withhold proprietary information or delay its release to avoid revealing it to 
their competitors. Hence, the degree of competition among firms can affect disclosure 
decisions (e.g., Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Li, 2010; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006). To take 
this effect into account, we control for the level of competition at the medical condition level. 
Specifically, we construct the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for clinical trials 
that involve the same medical condition in the year of the trial due date (Normalized Trial HHI). 
A higher value of Normalized Trial HHI indicates less competition for clinical trials pertaining 
to the same medical condition.  
Moreover, firms may engage in multiple clinical trials for the same medical condition at 
different points of time, and their disclosure decisions regarding the results of prior trials could 
influence their disclosure decisions about future trials pertaining to the same medical condition. 
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Hence, we include the number of past clinical trial disclosures provided by the same firm 
pertaining to the same medical condition (Own Past Disclosures). Own Past Disclosures is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of past clinical trial disclosures provided by the same 
firm for the same medical condition within the 365-day window before the due date of the trial 
results. 
In addition, Verrecchia (1983, 2001) and Dye (1985) argue that firms voluntarily disclose 
good news and withhold bad news. Thus, for the subsample of firms that disclose their clinical 
trial results, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the (-1, +1) three-day 
window around the clinical trial result disclosures to proxy for whether the trial result is good 
or bad news. Specifically, Current Own CAR (-1, +1) equals one if the CAR in the (-1, +1) 
window is positive, and zero otherwise. CAR is measured based on the market model (MM) 
over the event window (-1, +1) around the clinical trial result disclosure.18 
Finally, we control for year fixed effects to take into account the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on firms’ disclosure decisions and firm fixed effects to capture unobserved firm-
level and time-invariant characteristics that may affect disclosure decisions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the trial 
level to account for heterogeneity and within-trial correlation.19 
5. Results 
5.1. Stock market reaction to peer disclosures 
To verify that there is information content in the disclosure of clinical trial results, we 
start with analyzing the stock market reaction to the firm’s own disclosures and the disclosures 
of their peers on ClinicalTrials.gov. In particular, if the firm’s own investors respond to the 
                                               
18 The results are robust if we use market-adjusted return (MAR) to calculate the CAR. 
19 A clinical trial can involve more than one medical condition and more than one firm-collaborator. Hence, 
within-trial correlation does exist. We also run robustness tests with standard errors clustered at the firm-year or 
firm level. Our results remain robust. The robustness tests for the main results are shown in Appendix B. 
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peer disclosures of clinical trial results, it provides suggestive evidence that peer disclosures 
are value-relevant. Following Foster (1981), we use a simple non-directional test of market 
reaction: absolute value of CAR over the three-day event window (-1, +1) around the disclosure 
date. Panel A of Table 3 shows the absolute abnormal market reaction to the firm’s own 
disclosure of clinical trial results. On average, investors react strongly to the firm’s own 
disclosures. This result indicates that investors use ClinicalTrials.gov to obtain clinical trial 
information, and they react to the disclosure of clinical trial results.20 Furthermore, Panel B of 
Table 3 presents the firm’s absolute abnormal market reaction when peers disclose the clinical 
trial results. On average, the non-disclosure firm’s investors also react strongly to peer 
disclosures. The absolute CAR to peer disclosures is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that investors in non-disclosure firms acquire 
value-relevant information from peer disclosures (see, e.g., Foster, 1981; Gleason et al., 2008; 
Han and Wild, 1990; Han et al., 1989).21 This univariate event analysis validates that clinical 
trial result disclosures on ClinicalTrials.gov have information content and can have an impact 
on the disclosure decisions of other firms in the same industry.  
5.2. Main result 
After showing that clinical trial result disclosures indeed have information content, we now 
proceed to examine the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s own disclosure decisions. In Table 
4 Panel A, we present the regression results pertaining to the effect of peer disclosures on a 
firm’s decision whether or not to disclose its own clinical trial results. In columns (1), (2) and 
(3), we include only firm-level characteristics, competition measure, and the firm’s own past 
disclosure. We use OLS estimation in columns (1) and (2) and probit estimation in column (3). 
                                               
20 In an untabulated test, we confirm that our results are robust to using Fama-French daily factors to calculate 
firms’ abnormal returns around the event window.  
21 For more detail, please see Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), Drake et al. (2016), Foster (1981), Gleason et al. 
(2008), Han and Wild (1990), Han et al. (1989), Olsen and Dietrich (1985), Shroff et al. (2017), and Xu et al. 
(2006).  
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We show models with year fixed effects in columns (1) and (3), and the model with year and 
firm fixed effects in column (2). The coefficient of the variable Peer Disclosures is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level across all columns. This result suggests that 
firms are less likely to disclose their clinical trial results if their competitors have already 
disclosed trial results pertaining to the same medical condition. In terms of economic 
significance, an increase of one standard deviation in peer disclosures in column (1) leads to a 
decrease of 6.5% in the probability of the firm’s own disclosure compared to its sample 
average. The economic magnitudes are similar whether we use OLS or probit regressions. 
In columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 4 Panel A, we include additional trial-level 
characteristics. Consistent with the results in columns (1) - (3), we find that the coefficient of 
the variable Peer Disclosures is negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The economic 
magnitudes of peer disclosures are very similar to those in columns (1) - (3). Taken together, 
the results in Table 4 Panel A are consistent with a negative association between peer 
disclosures and the firm’s own likelihood of disclosing clinical trial results. 
Furthermore, the signs of the explanatory variables are generally consistent with the prior 
literature. For instance, larger firms and firms with higher analyst following are more likely to 
disclose their clinical trial results. This is consistent with the notion that larger firms and firms 
with higher analyst following have higher political and capital market pressure, which 
incentivizes them to remain transparent to investors. In addition, firms are more likely to 
disclose clinical trial results when there are more complete results, when the trial is in a later 
phase, and when the trial is under FDA oversight. Consistent with our expectation, firms also 
follow a persistent disclosure policy. Specifically, the coefficient on the variable Own Past 
Disclosures is positive and significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to disclose their 
clinical trial results if they have made similar disclosures in the past. Taken together, the 
significant coefficients associated with trial-level characteristics (e.g., Complete Results, FDA 
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Oversight and Phase) after we control for firm fixed effects suggest that the firm’s disclosure 
decision is affected not only by firm-level factors but also by trial-level characteristics. 
Next, we focus on the subsample of firms that have disclosed clinical trial results and 
examine the effect of peer disclosures on the firm’s decisions of whether to disclose the results 
on time. As a result, the sample size drops to 3,054 observations. We use both OLS and probit 
regressions, and we present the results with and without trial-level characteristics. The results 
in Table 4 Panel B show that the coefficient on Peer Disclosures is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level across all columns. In terms of economic magnitudes, an increase 
of one standard deviation in peer disclosures leads to a decrease of about 10.3% in the 
probability of the firm’s timely disclosure relative to the sample mean (column 4). These results 
are consistent with firms delaying their own disclosures of clinical trial results following peer 
disclosures.  
Similar to the findings in Table 4 Panel A, the coefficient on the variable Market 
Capitalization is positive and statistically significant in most of the regressions in Table 4 Panel 
B, indicating that larger firms are more likely to submit their clinical trial results on time. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on the variables Industry Funding Source, FDA Oversight and 
Phase are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (4) - (9) of Table 4 
Panel B. These results suggest that clinical trials that are funded by industry, under FDA 
oversight and in a more advanced phase are more likely to be disclosed on time. In addition, 
the coefficient on the variable Lead Sponsor is also positive and significant at the 1% level in 
models (5) and (8) after we control for both firm and year fixed effects, suggesting that the lead 
sponsor is more likely to disclose the trial results. Consistent with Anderson et al. (2015), we 
find that industry funding source is positively associated with early disclosure of clinical trial 
results. 
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In columns (7) - (9) of Table 4 Panel B, we further control for the stock market reaction for 
the subsample of firms that have disclosed their clinical trial results. The stock market reaction 
captures whether investors perceive the clinical trial results as good news or bad news, which 
can impact the firm’s own disclosure decisions. After controlling for the nature of the clinical 
trial results, we find that the coefficient on the variable Peer Disclosures stays negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the coefficient on the variable Current Own CAR (-1, 
+1) is positive and significant at the 5% or 10% level, indicating that firms are more likely to 
disclose their clinical trial results on time if the results are favorable. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that firms voluntarily disclose good news and withhold bad news (Dye, 1985; 
Verrecchia, 1983, 2001). 
5.3. Exogenous test 
So far, we have documented a negative association between peer disclosures and the firm’s 
own disclosure. To attempt to establish a causal link between peer disclosures and the firm’s 
own disclosure, we use arguably exogenous shocks to peer disclosures at the clinical trial level. 
To do so, we first identify firms that publicly committed to disclose all clinical trial results on 
ClinicalTrials.gov within one year of the trial completion, regardless of the clinical study 
outcome (i.e., in full compliance with the FDAAA). As discussed in Section 2, there are two 
pharmaceutical firms that made commitment to disclose all of their clinical trial results: 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) since May 2013 and Novartis since 2009. Next, we use these two 
firms’ batch disclosures (i.e., disclosure of more than five clinical trial results for various 
different medical conditions on a single day) as plausible shocks to peer disclosures of trial 
results for the same medical condition. The intuition is that these batch disclosures provided 
by committed firms are likely to be driven by firm characteristics rather than clinical trial 
characteristics, which makes the batch disclosures plausibly exogenous to the disclosure of a 
particular clinical trial result of certain medical condition by firms that made no such 
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commitment. Since the batch disclosures on different days are related to different medical 
conditions, we examine these batch disclosures separately. Specifically, we identify three batch 
disclosures made by GSK on June 6, June 12 and December 19, 2013, as well as another three 
batch disclosures made by Novartis on December 14 and December 20, 2010, and July 22, 
2011 as plausibly exogenous shocks to peer disclosure at the clinical trial level. 
Finally, we estimate the following regressions using a difference-in-differences research 
design: 
Model 3: 
Disclosure = β0 + β1 · Treat + β2 · Post + β3 · Treat X Post + ∑ n · Firm-Level Controls  
+ ∑ n · Clinical Trial-Level Controls + Year Fixed Effects + Firm Fixed Effects 
+ ε.          (3) 
Model 4: 
Timely Disclosure = β0 + β1 · Treat + β2 · Post + β3 · Treat X Post + ∑ n · Firm-Level Controls  
+ ∑ n · Clinical Trial-Level Controls + n+1 · Current Own CAR (-1, +1) 
+ Year Fixed Effects + Firm Fixed Effects + ε.   (4) 
In Models 3 and 4, the variable Treat is a binary variable equal to one if the clinical trial is 
related to the same medical condition as the exogenous peer disclosure (i.e., batch disclosure) 
but belongs to a firm different from the exogenous disclosure event firms, and zero otherwise. 
Post is a binary variable equal to one if both the trial completion date and the trial result 
reporting date are within one year after the exogenous shock, and zero otherwise. The variable 
of interest is the interaction term Treat X Post, whose coefficient is β3. If treatment clinical trial 
results for the same medical condition as a batch disclosure are less likely to be disclosed in 
the post period, the coefficient β3 should be negative and statistically significant. We include 
the same control variables as in Models (1) and (2), and we estimate Models (3) and (4) 
separately for each of the six shocks that we identify in our sample.  
In Table 5 Panel A, we present our difference-in-differences estimation results for the three 
GSK shocks, and in Panel B we show the results for the three Novartis shocks. The coefficients 
on Treat X Post are negative and statistically significant in Model 3 across all three GSK shocks 
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and all three Novartis shocks. These results corroborate our main finding that the firm is less 
likely to make its own disclosures when peers have disclosed trial results related to the same 
medical condition. In Model 4, the coefficient on Treat X Post is negative and statistically 
significant in two GSK shocks and all three Novartis shock tests, which provides consistent 
evidence that peer disclosures reduce the likelihood of the firm’s own timely disclosure. 
We acknowledge that the validity of these exogenous tests crucially depends on GSK and 
Novartis’s commitment to fully disclose their clinical trial results as well as the randomness of 
their batch disclosures. However, to the extent that these batch disclosures are orthogonal to 
various time-varying firm characteristics, clinical trial characteristics, and firm fixed effects, 
they are considerably exogenous to a firm’s disclosure decisions at the clinical trial level.  
6. Cross-sectional analyses 
6.1. The role of proprietary cost 
In this subsection, we explore whether the relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s 
own disclosure of clinical trial results varies with the proprietary costs of disclosure. Verrecchia 
(1983) and Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) argue that competition among existing rivals 
increases the proprietary costs of disclosure for the firm and thus decreases the likelihood of 
the firm’s disclosure. To capture the level of proprietary costs of disclosure embedded in peer 
disclosures, we first split peer disclosures into trials with complete and incomplete results. 
Incomplete result trials include those with a recruitment status of active, not recruiting; 
enrolling by invitation; not yet recruiting; recruiting; suspended; terminated; and withdrawn. 
To the extent that trials with completed results signal that the peers are close to 
commercializing the medical products, such trial result disclosures increase competition at the 
medical condition level. We thus expect the impact of peer disclosures with complete results 
on the firm’s own disclosure decisions to be more negative than those with incomplete results. 
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Consistent with our expectation, the results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 Panel A show 
that the negative effect of peer disclosures on the firm’s decision to make its own disclosures 
is driven by peer disclosures of complete clinical trial results. Specifically, the coefficient on 
the variable Peer Disclosures with Complete Results is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, while the coefficient on the variable Peer Disclosures with Incomplete Results is 
not statistically significant. F-test results suggest that the difference between the two 
coefficients is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 Panel A, we examine the effect of peer disclosures with 
complete results versus those with incomplete results on the firm’s decision of whether to 
disclose its own trial results on time. Consistent with the results in columns (1) and (2), the 
coefficient on the variable Peer Disclosures with Complete Results is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in columns (3) and (4), while the coefficient on the variable Peer 
Disclosures with Incomplete Results is not significant. F-test results suggest that the differences 
between the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, conditional on 
disclosing their own clinical trial results, firms are also less likely to disclose the results on 
time if their peers have disclosed the results of complete clinical trials. 
Like the peer disclosure of completed trial results, the peer disclosure of later-stage trial 
results signals that the peers’ medical products are close to FDA approval, which increases the 
competition among existing pharmaceutical firms that conduct trials related to the same 
medical condition. Consequently, the proprietary costs of the firm’s disclosure increase. We 
thus split peer disclosures into late- versus early-stage clinical trial results. Late-stage clinical 
trials are Phase 3 and 4 trials, while early-phase clinical trials are Phase 0, 1, and 2 trials.22 We 
                                               
22 We do not restrict the phases to those beyond Phase 1 in the pool of peer clinical trial disclosures. Peers can 
voluntarily disclose clinical trial results related to Phases 0 and 1. 
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expect the coefficient on Peer Disclosures Late Stage to be more negative than that on Peer 
Disclosures Early Stage. 
Table 6 Panel B presents the corresponding results. We provide consistent evidence that 
firms are more sensitive to their peers publishing the results of clinical trials that are in later 
phases as opposed to earlier phases. Specifically, the coefficients on the variable Peer 
Disclosures Late Stage are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level throughout the 
specifications, while the coefficient on the variable Peer Disclosures Early Stage is either 
insignificant or significant only at the 5% level. In columns (1) and (2), F-test results show that 
the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the impact of peer disclosures on the firm’s own likelihood of disclosure is 
driven by peer disclosures at the later stage. However, in columns (3) and (4), the F-test results 
are not statistically significant between the two coefficients. Thus, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effect of peer disclosures on the firm’s timeliness of disclosure does not 
vary with the stage of clinical trials. 
Taken together, these results support the argument that the impact of peer disclosures on 
the likelihood and timeliness of the firm’s own disclosure is stronger when the proprietary costs 
of disclosure caused by peer disclosures are higher.23 
Next, we directly construct a competition measure at the medical condition level to further 
investigate whether the relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s own disclosures of 
clinical trial results varies with the proprietary costs of disclosure. Specifically, we construct a 
normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for the trials pertaining to the same medical condition 
in the year of the clinical trial result due date (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Bamber and Cheon, 
1998; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). A lower value of Normalized Trial HHI indicates more 
                                               
23 We find similar results using probit models. However, according to Ai and Norton (2003), the interpretation of 
the interaction term in non-linear models (e.g., logit and probit models) is problematic. Hence, we do not report 
these results. 
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competition among medical products for the same medical condition in a given year. We 
further define Low Normalized Trial HHI as equal to one if the trial Normalized Trial HHI is 
below the median, and zero otherwise. We then interact Peer Disclosures with Low Normalized 
Trial HHI and expect the coefficients on the interaction term to be negative and statistically 
significant. 
In Table 6 Panel C, we present the corresponding results. The coefficient on the interaction 
term Peer Disclosures X Low Normalized Trial HHI is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% or 10% level across the four specifications. These results are consistent with our 
argument that firms are less likely to disclose clinical trial results and are less likely to disclose 
on time when peers report their clinical trials results in a highly competitive environment, i.e., 
when proprietary costs of disclosure are high. 
6.2. Good news vs. bad news 
So far, we have been silent on whether the impact of peer disclosures on the firm’s own 
disclosure decisions depends on the nature of peer disclosures. If peer disclosures convey good 
news, investors are likely to upwardly adjust the prior about the firm that is conducting similar 
trials and reduce the firm’s incentive to disclose. However, if peer disclosures convey bad 
news, the firm has incentives to disclose its own trial results when its own results are more 
favorable than the bad news conveyed in peer disclosures. Thus, the negative relation between 
peer disclosures and the firm’s own disclosures should be weaker when peer disclosures lead 
to a negative market reaction. 
To capture the overall market reaction to peer disclosures, we define bad market news as 
peer disclosures that cause a negative market reaction for peers (Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of 
Peer Disclosures) as well as for the firm itself (Past Own CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures). 
Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures equals one if the peers’ average CAR around their 
disclosures of clinical trial results over the past one year is negative, and zero otherwise. Past 
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Own CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures equals one if the firm’s own CAR around its peers’ 
disclosures of clinical trial results over the past one year is negative, and 0 otherwise. We then 
create a binary variable Past Bad Market News equal to one if both Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of 
Peer Disclosures and Past Own CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures are equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. This variable represents peer disclosures of bad news for both peers and the firm. 
We interact the variable Peer Disclosures with Past Bad Market News. Table 7 presents the 
corresponding results. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in columns (1) - (3) and insignificant in column (4). Overall, these 
results are consistent with our argument that firms are more likely to disclose clinical trial 
results and to disclose on time when peer disclosures convey bad news. 
Finally, we include additional control variables in our main regression models (Models 1 
and 2) to control for whether good news and bad news conveyed in peer disclosures have an 
impact on our results. Specifically, we add to our models the average market reactions to peer 
disclosures (Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures) and average market reaction to a firm 
when peers disclose (Past Own CAR (-1, +1) of Peer Disclosures). After we control for the 
nature of peer disclosures, the coefficients on the main independent variable of interest, Peer 
Disclosure, are still negative and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels in Table 8. 
7. Conclusion 
We examine whether a pharmaceutical firm’s decision to disclose its clinical trial results 
depends on the number of peer disclosures. More specifically, we test whether the firm 
discloses clinical trial results and whether it discloses the results on time when its peers have 
already reported their clinical trial results for the same medical condition. We find that the 
probability that the firm will report clinical trial results decreases in the number of peer 
disclosures. Conditional on disclosing clinical trial results, the firm is also less likely to disclose 
its own results on time when many peers have reported their clinical trial results. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344942 
 
 
32 
To draw a causal inference about this relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s own 
disclosure, we identify two firms that publicly committed to disclose clinical trial results and 
in six instances disclosed multiple clinical trials on a single day (i.e., issued batch disclosures). 
The batch disclosures represent exogenous shocks to other firms’ decision of whether to report 
a particular clinical trial result pertaining to the same medical condition. The result is consistent 
with peer disclosures having a negative impact on the probability of the firm’s own disclosures. 
Our results also suggest that the relation between peer and own clinical trial result 
disclosures is driven by proprietary cost concerns. In particular, the negative effect of peer 
disclosures on the firm’s own disclosure is more pronounced when peer disclosures are about 
trials with complete results or trials at later stages and when the competition at the medical 
condition level is high. Moreover, the negative relation between peer and own clinical trial 
result disclosures is weaker if peer disclosures trigger a negative market reaction. 
Our study adds to the literature by providing new evidence on the impact of peer disclosures 
on the firm’s own disclosure of non-financial proprietary information. In particular, our 
findings suggest that the relation between peer disclosures and the firm’s own disclosures 
varies with the proprietary cost of disclosure embedded in peer disclosures and the nature of 
peer disclosures. Nevertheless, since the conclusions are drawn on the pharmaceutical industry 
alone, we caution the generality of the findings. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Disclosure Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm discloses its own clinical trial result and 0 otherwise. 
Aggregate Analysis 
of 
ClincalTrials.gov 
(AACT)  
Timely Disclosure Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm submits the clinical trial result before or on the due date and 0 otherwise. AACT 
Peer Disclosures 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of peers’ clinical trials result disclosures pertaining to the same MeSH 
medical condition, measured within the one-year window of the firm’s clinical trial result due date. AACT 
Market Capitalization 
Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the fiscal year end prior to the firm’s clinical trial result due 
date. Compustat 
Book-to-Market  
Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the fiscal year end prior to the firm’s clinical trial 
result due date. Compustat 
Stock Return Volatility  Standard deviation of stock return over the year prior to the firm’s clinical trial result due date. CRSP 
Stock Return  Cumulative daily stock return over the year prior to the firm’s clinical trial result due date. CRSP 
ROA Net income of the fiscal year prior to the result due date divided by the lagged total assets. Compustat 
Loss Binary variable equal to 1 if net income of the fiscal year prior to the result due date is negative and 0 otherwise.  Compustat 
Institutional Ownership  Average percentage of institutional ownership over the year prior to the result due date.  Thomson Reuters 
Analyst Following  Average number of analysts following a firm over the year prior to the result due date.  I/B/E/S 
Complete Results Binary variable equal to 1 if clinical trial recruitment is complete at the time of disclosure and 0 otherwise.  AACT 
Lead Sponsor  Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is the lead sponsor in the clinical trial and 0 otherwise. AACT 
Number of Sponsors Number of collaborators in a clinical trial. AACT 
Industry Funding Source 
Binary variable equal to 1 if clinical trial is funded only by industry, not solely by NIH or other research 
institutions and 0 otherwise. AACT 
FDA Oversight Binary variable equal to 1 if clinical trial is under FDA authority or jurisdiction and 0 otherwise. AACT 
Phase Clinical trial phase. AACT 
Normalized Trial HHI  
Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for the trials pertaining to the same medical condition in the year of 
the clinical trial result due date. A higher value of normalized trial HHI indicates less competition for clinical 
trials related to the same medical condition.  
AACT and 
Compustat 
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Variable Definition Source 
Own Past Disclosures 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of past clinical trial disclosures provided by the same firm for the 
same medical condition within the 365-day window before the trial due date.  AACT 
Current Own CAR (-1, +1) 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the three-day window (-1, +1) around the 
disclosure date is positive and 0 otherwise. CAR is calculated based on the Market Model (MM) over the event 
window (-1, +1) around the clinical trial disclosure. 
Eventus 
Peer Disclosures with Complete 
Results 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of peers’ complete clinical trial result disclosures pertaining to the 
same MeSH medical condition, measured within the one-year window before the current trial result due date.  AACT 
Peer Disclosures with Incomplete 
Results 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of peers’ incomplete clinical trial result disclosures pertaining to the 
same MeSH medical condition, measured within the one-year window before the current trial result due date.  AACT 
Peer Disclosures Late Stage 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of peers’ clinical trial result disclosures pertaining to the same MeSH 
medical condition at the later phases (i.e., more advanced than Phase 2), measured within the one-year window 
before the current trial result due date.  
AACT 
Peer Disclosures Early Stage 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of peers’ clinical trial result disclosures pertaining to the same MeSH 
medical condition at the early phases (i.e., Phases 0, 1, and 2), measured within the one-year window before the 
current trial result due date.  
AACT 
Absolute CAR (-1, +1) in Response 
to Firm’s Own Disclosure 
Absolute value of the firm’s CAR (-1, +1) in response to firm’s own disclosure. Eventus 
Absolute CAR (-1, +1) in Response 
to Peer Disclosure 
Absolute value of the firm’s CAR (-1, +1) in response to peers’ disclosures. Eventus 
Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of Peers’ 
Disclosures 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the peers’ average CAR around the peers’ clinical trial disclosures over the past 
one year is negative and 0 otherwise.  Eventus 
Past Own CAR (-1, +1) of Peers’ 
Disclosures 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s own CARs around its peers’ clinical trial disclosures over the past one 
year is negative and 0 otherwise. Eventus 
Past Bad Market News 
Binary variable equal to 1 if both Past Peer CAR (-1, +1) of Peers’ Disclosures and Past Own CAR (-1, +1) of 
Peers’ Disclosures are equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Eventus 
Treat 
Binary variable equal to 1 if clinical trial pertains to the same MeSH medical condition as the exogenous 
disclosure event trials but belongs to a firm different from the exogenous disclosure event firms, and 0 otherwise.  AACT 
Post 
Binary variable equal to 1 if clinical trial result disclosure date and trial completion date are both within one 
year after the disclosure date of the exogenous disclosure event and 0 otherwise. AACT 
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Standard Errors Clustered at the Firm-Year Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
              
Peer Disclosures -0.0249*** -0.0179* -0.0268** -0.0404*** -0.0298** -0.0503*** 
  (-2.59) (-1.87) (-2.46) (-2.90) (-2.11) (-2.87) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)       0.0342* 0.0287 0.0393 
        (1.76) (1.43) (1.63) 
              
Observations 5,297 5,204 5,297 2,970 2,920 2,970 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1546 0.2209 0.1244 0.2288 0.2931 0.1913 
Area under ROC curve     0.7329     0.7846 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Model OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
This table presents robustness tests results for the main results with standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also 
provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in columns (1) and (3) because singleton observations are dropped 
when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (4) to (6). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Panel B: Standard Errors Clustered at the Firm Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
              
Peer Disclosures -0.0249** -0.0179* -0.0268** -0.0404*** -0.0298** -0.0503*** 
  (-2.55) (-1.94) (-2.41) (-2.75) (-2.02) (-2.81) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)       0.0342* 0.0287 0.0393* 
        (1.86) (1.35) (1.67) 
              
Observations 5,297 5,204 5,297 2,970 2,920 2,970 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1546 0.2207 0.1244 0.2288 0.2929 0.1913 
Area under ROC curve     0.7329     0.7846 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Model OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
This table presents robustness tests results for the main results with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also 
provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in columns (1) and (3) because singleton observations are dropped 
when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (4) to (6). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample selection procedure N# of observations   
N# of unique 
clinical trials 
AACT database of trials with complete sponsors information   288,592     186,941 
Exclude non-industry sponsored trials -210,884 77,708   -115,899 71,042 
Exclude trials with missing information on registered countries -9,758 67,950   -9,073 61,969 
Exclude non-interventional/non-completed trials, exclude trials in the phases 0 or 1, 
and exclude trials whose primary completion date is before November 2007 
or after March 2014 
-49,436 18,514   -45,299 16,670 
Exclude trials without information on intervention type -1 18,513   -1 16,669 
Exclude trials that are not authorized by FDA and are not registered in USA or whose 
interventional types are not biological, drug, device, genetic or radiation -7,722 10,791   -7,058 9,611 
Exclude trials that are not associated with any listed firms -2,525 8,266   -2,054 7,557 
Exclude duplicate observations of trials whose sponsors are from the same parent firm -112 8,154   -0 7,557 
Delete observations with missing value in variables of interest and control variables -2 783 5,371   -2 449 5,108 
Exclude observations of clinical trials that are treated as exogenous event firms (GSK 
and Novartis) clinical trials -74 
   -73  
Final sample of trials   5,297     5,035 
This table presents our sample selection process. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Disclosure 5,297 0.577 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Timely Disclosure 3,054 0.520 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Peer Disclosures (raw number) 5,297 19.845 22.542 3.000 12.000 28.000 
Peer Disclosures (log form) 5,297 2.351 1.310 1.386 2.565 3.367 
Peer Disclosures with Complete Results (raw number) 5,297 16.300 19.536 2.000 10.000 23.000 
Peer Disclosures with Complete Results (log form) 5,297 2.183 1.268 1.099 2.398 3.178 
Peer Disclosures with Incomplete Results (raw number) 5,297 3.530 5.275 0.000 1.000 5.000 
Peer Disclosures with Incomplete Results (log form) 5,297 1.015 0.955 0.000 0.693 1.792 
Peer Disclosures Later Stage (raw number) 5,297 10.629 14.380 1.000 6.000 13.000 
Peer Disclosures Late Stage (log form) 5,297 1.792 1.198 0.693 1.946 2.639 
Peer Disclosures Early Stage (raw number) 5,297 9.337 13.031 1.000 4.000 12.000 
Peer Disclosures Early Stage (log form) 5,297 1.613 1.232 0.693 1.609 2.565 
Firm-level control variables             
Market Capitalization 5,297 10.180 2.293 9.414 11.070 11.760 
Book-to-Market 5,297 0.491 0.196 0.375 0.491 0.621 
Stock Return Volatility 5,297 0.021 0.016 0.011 0.015 0.025 
Stock Return 5,297 0.204 0.400 0.013 0.172 0.317 
ROA 5,297 -0.005 0.326 0.041 0.075 0.119 
Loss 5,297 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Institutional Ownership 5,297 0.430 0.360 0.000 0.595 0.707 
Analyst Following 5,297 12.290 7.951 4.333 12.750 19.580 
Trial-level control variables             
Complete Results 5,297 0.824 0.381 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Lead Sponsor 5,297 0.712 0.453 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Number of Sponsors 5,297 1.635 0.834 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Industry Funding Source 5,297 0.758 0.428 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FDA Oversight 5,297 0.844 0.362 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Phase 5,297 2.631 0.766 2.000 2.500 3.000 
Normalized Trial HHI 5,297 0.319 0.351 0.075 0.132 0.406 
Own Past Disclosures (raw number) 5,297 1.402 2.632 0.000 0.000 2.000 
Own Past Disclosures (log form) 5,297 0.529 0.739 0.000 0.000 1.099 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1) 2,970 0.480 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for a sample of 305 firms in the pharmaceutical industry from 2007 to 2014. The entire sample consists of 5,035 
unique clinical trials (5,297 trial-firm observations). We collect clinical trial data from the Aggregate Analysis of ClincalTrials.gov (AACT) database obtained through the Clinical Trials 
Transformation Initiative (CTTI) website, whose data source is the ClinicalTrials.gov website as of March 27, 2015. We match clinical trial data by company name with Compustat, CRSP and 
Thomson Reuters to get financial data. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 3. Market Reaction to Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results 
Panel A: Firm’s own market reaction to disclosure of own clinical trial results  
Variable N mean sd p-value [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Absolute CAR (-1,+1) in Response to Firm's Own Disclosure 2,970 0.0169*** 0.0175 0.0000 0.0162 0.0175 
 
Panel B: Firm’s own market reaction to peer disclosure of clinical trial results 
Variable N mean sd p-value [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Absolute CAR (-1,+1) in Response to Peer Disclosure 79,080 0. 0177*** 0.0195 0.0000 0.0176 0.0178 
This table presents the market reaction to the disclosure of clinical trial results. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
calculated based on the basic market model (MM) over the event window (-1, +1) around the clinical trial disclosure. Peer clinical trial results with the same medical condition are those disclosed 
within the 365-day window before the firm’s clinical trial due date. 
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Table 4. Main Results 
Panel A: Peer disclosures and firms’ decisions to disclose clinical trial results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure 
              
Peer Disclosures -0.0288*** -0.0192** -0.0312*** -0.0249*** -0.0179** -0.0268*** 
  (-3.50) (-2.25) (-3.46) (-3.10) (-2.13) (-2.93) 
Market Capitalization 0.0123** 0.0077 0.0135** 0.0138** 0.0140 0.0155** 
  (2.14) (0.28) (2.11) (2.42) (0.52) (2.37) 
Book-to-Market -0.2030*** -0.1357 -0.2227*** -0.2063*** -0.1132 -0.2322*** 
  (-5.75) (-1.19) (-5.70) (-5.91) (-1.01) (-5.77) 
Stock Return Volatility -0.7578 -0.9991 -0.7528 -0.3989 -0.9214 -0.3904 
  (-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.52) (-0.88) (-0.46) 
Stock Return 0.0272 0.0069 0.0299 0.0217 0.0046 0.0247 
  (1.52) (0.37) (1.55) (1.22) (0.25) (1.26) 
ROA 0.0165 0.0716 0.0177 -0.0068 0.0631 -0.0110 
  (0.52) (1.50) (0.52) (-0.21) (1.34) (-0.32) 
Loss -0.0118 -0.0071 -0.0114 -0.0129 -0.0052 -0.0192 
  (-0.43) (-0.20) (-0.38) (-0.47) (-0.15) (-0.62) 
Institutional Ownership -0.0225 0.0736 -0.0281 -0.0186 0.0205 -0.0254 
  (-0.68) (0.89) (-0.77) (-0.57) (0.24) (-0.69) 
Analyst Following 0.0052*** 0.0022 0.0058*** 0.0050*** 0.0004 0.0057*** 
  (3.49) (0.59) (3.54) (3.36) (0.11) (3.42) 
Complete Results       0.0548*** 0.0591*** 0.0598*** 
        (3.04) (3.20) (2.99) 
Lead Sponsor       0.0184 -0.0001 0.0221 
        (0.86) (-0.00) (0.90) 
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Number of Sponsors       0.0148 0.0142 0.0153 
        (1.20) (1.06) (1.11) 
Industry Funding Source       -0.0071 0.0126 -0.0008 
        (-0.26) (0.43) (-0.02) 
FDA Oversight       0.0544** 0.0473* 0.0574** 
        (2.35) (1.94) (2.12) 
Phase       0.1264*** 0.1168*** 0.1408*** 
        (13.40) (11.72) (12.91) 
Normalized Trial HHI 0.0203 -0.0090 0.0246 0.0004 -0.0223 0.0046 
  (0.75) (-0.32) (0.82) (0.01) (-0.81) (0.15) 
Own Past Disclosures 0.1315*** 0.1267*** 0.1462*** 0.1137*** 0.1117*** 0.1296*** 
  (13.65) (12.34) (12.65) (11.92) (11.05) (11.11) 
              
Observations 5,297 5,204 5,297 5,297 5,204 5,297 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1181 0.1918 0.0932 0.1546 0.2209 0.1244 
Area under ROC curve     0.7004     0.7329 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Model OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s decision of whether to disclose its own clinical trial results. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are 
shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is 
different from that in columns (1) and (3) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (4) to (6). 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Peer disclosures and firms’ decisions to disclose clinical trial results on time 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
                    
Peer Disclosures -0.0431*** -0.0303*** -0.0510*** -0.0409*** -0.0312*** -0.0511*** -0.0404*** -0.0298*** -0.0503*** 
  (-4.10) (-2.82) (-4.19) (-4.00) (-3.02) (-3.98) (-3.89) (-2.84) (-3.88) 
Market Capitalization 0.0241*** -0.0630 0.0258*** 0.0291*** -0.0422 0.0336*** 0.0284*** -0.0249 0.0321*** 
  (2.89) (-1.54) (2.74) (3.57) (-1.05) (3.42) (3.32) (-0.60) (3.14) 
Book-to-Market 0.1086** -0.1938 0.1187** 0.1594*** -0.1158 0.1941*** 0.1753*** -0.1068 0.2159*** 
  (2.24) (-1.13) (2.16) (3.36) (-0.71) (3.32) (3.60) (-0.62) (3.64) 
Stock Return Volatility 0.8985 0.8077 0.9173 0.8618 0.3268 0.9554 1.1126 1.1007 1.2301 
  (0.84) (0.57) (0.72) (0.83) (0.24) (0.72) (0.97) (0.69) (0.86) 
Stock Return -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0035 -0.0125 -0.0089 -0.0105 -0.0096 -0.0076 -0.0058 
  (-0.22) (0.22) (-0.13) (-0.55) (-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.20) 
ROA 0.0699* 0.1112* 0.0968* 0.0591 0.1171* 0.0924* 0.0870** 0.1356** 0.1387** 
  (1.90) (1.67) (1.87) (1.60) (1.81) (1.67) (2.27) (2.06) (2.29) 
Loss 0.0390 0.0403 0.0396 0.0147 0.0348 0.0197 0.0332 0.0645 0.0458 
  (1.06) (0.83) (0.93) (0.41) (0.75) (0.45) (0.88) (1.31) (0.99) 
Institutional Ownership 0.0097 0.1716 0.0139 0.0638 0.0255 0.0755 0.0784* 0.0051 0.0938* 
  (0.22) (1.26) (0.27) (1.46) (0.19) (1.43) (1.71) (0.03) (1.72) 
Analyst Following 0.0021 0.0031 0.0020 0.0005 0.0030 0.0004 0.0001 0.0020 -0.0001 
  (1.04) (0.64) (0.90) (0.24) (0.64) (0.17) (0.04) (0.41) (-0.04) 
Complete Results       0.0231 0.0306 0.0278 0.0146 0.0231 0.0167 
        (0.95) (1.27) (0.92) (0.59) (0.94) (0.54) 
Lead Sponsor       0.0417 0.0900*** 0.0490 0.0585* 0.0940*** 0.0699** 
        (1.45) (2.67) (1.45) (1.96) (2.78) (2.03) 
Number of Sponsors       -0.0228 -0.0075 -0.0305 -0.0244 -0.0091 -0.0319 
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        (-1.26) (-0.41) (-1.33) (-1.36) (-0.50) (-1.42) 
Industry Funding Source       0.2071*** 0.1966*** 0.2362*** 0.1820*** 0.1892*** 0.2062*** 
        (5.82) (4.93) (5.97) (4.89) (4.66) (4.97) 
FDA Oversight       0.1026*** 0.0923*** 0.1276*** 0.1080*** 0.0961*** 0.1328*** 
        (3.81) (3.25) (3.81) (3.86) (3.31) (3.87) 
Phase       0.0621*** 0.0525*** 0.0780*** 0.0675*** 0.0555*** 0.0840*** 
        (5.55) (4.51) (5.52) (5.89) (4.71) (5.84) 
Normalized Trial HHI -0.0293 -0.0131 -0.0364 -0.0634* -0.0373 -0.0762* -0.0649* -0.0422 -0.0782* 
  (-0.83) (-0.37) (-0.93) (-1.86) (-1.09) (-1.82) (-1.86) (-1.23) (-1.85) 
Own Past Disclosures 0.1644*** 0.1343*** 0.1845*** 0.1260*** 0.1039*** 0.1509*** 0.1247*** 0.1022*** 0.1485*** 
  (13.29) (10.04) (12.25) (10.42) (8.05) (9.62) (10.24) (7.87) (9.43) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)             0.0342** 0.0287* 0.0393* 
              (2.10) (1.75) (1.94) 
                    
Observations 3,054 2,997 3,054 3,054 2,997 3,054 2,970 2,920 2,970 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1481 0.2146 0.1202 0.2336 0.2932 0.1947 0.2288 0.2931 0.1913 
Area under ROC curve     0.7271     0.7864     0.7846 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Model OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s decision regarding whether to disclose its own clinical trial results on time. The subsample consists of 
2,903 unique clinical trials (3,054 trial-firm observations). Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard 
errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is 
not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in columns (1) and (3) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included 
in the regression. The same applies to columns (4) to (9). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Exogenous Disclosure Events 
Panel A: Exogenous disclosure events by GlaxoSmithKline in June and December 2013 
Exogenous Disclosure Events GSK June 06, 2013 GSK June 12, 2013 GSK December 19, 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
                          
Treat -0.0114 -0.0068 -0.0172 -0.0170 -0.0031 0.0208 -0.0680 -0.0590 0.0882** 0.1030** -0.1238** -0.1080* 
  (-0.39) (-0.22) (-0.43) (-0.41) (-0.08) (0.46) (-1.19) (-1.01) (2.30) (2.46) (-2.35) (-1.92) 
Post 0.4808*** 0.4613*** 0.3191*** 0.2692*** 0.4739*** 0.4579*** 0.3045*** 0.2588*** 0.5260*** 0.5175*** 0.1975*** 0.1851*** 
  (16.31) (14.29) (7.29) (5.24) (16.68) (14.95) (7.20) (5.36) (14.44) (13.25) (5.02) (4.05) 
Treat X Post -0.1215*** -0.0807* -0.1966*** -0.0702 -0.1197** -0.0991* -0.1314* -0.0188 -0.2059*** -0.2116*** 0.0450 0.0553 
  (-3.02) (-1.77) (-3.42) (-1.07) (-2.48) (-1.86) (-1.93) (-0.26) (-3.50) (-3.51) (0.62) (0.68) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0336** 0.0286*     0.0338** 0.0287*     0.0332** 0.0279* 
      (2.06) (1.74)     (2.07) (1.75)     (2.03) (1.70) 
                          
Observations 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1586 0.2254 0.2284 0.2937 0.1589 0.2258 0.2287 0.2939 0.1609 0.2283 0.2272 0.2932 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents regression results of the difference-in-difference research design on the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s disclosure of its own clinical trial results, as well as the timeliness of its disclosure. 
The exogenous disclosure events are GlaxoSmithKline’s disclosures of a batch of more than five clinical trial results per day on June 6, June 12 and December 19, 2013. Firm- and trial-level control variables are the 
same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models 
is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1)) because singleton observations are dropped when both year 
and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (3) to (12). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Exogenous disclosure events by Novartis in December 2010 and July 2011 
Exogenous Disclosure Events NOVARTIS December 14, 2010 NOVARTIS December 20, 2010 NOVARTIS July 22, 2011 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
                          
Treat 0.0034 -0.0233 -0.0955* -0.0165 0.0063 -0.0285 -0.0551* -0.0330 0.0199 -0.0128 0.0565 0.0027 
  (0.09) (-0.52) (-1.81) (-0.30) (0.24) (-1.08) (-1.70) (-0.92) (0.60) (-0.37) (1.30) (0.06) 
Post 0.3186*** 0.3134*** 0.5192*** 0.4967*** 0.3154*** 0.3110*** 0.5016*** 0.4802*** 0.3157*** 0.3076*** 0.4487*** 0.3973*** 
  (12.71) (11.98) (14.36) (11.93) (13.06) (12.47) (14.22) (12.19) (8.70) (7.44) (8.78) (7.33) 
Treat X Post -0.1579*** -0.0746 -0.2228*** -0.3251*** -0.1558*** -0.0670 -0.2439*** -0.2909*** -0.1033** -0.0862 -0.2165*** -0.1915** 
  (-3.01) (-1.31) (-2.60) (-3.26) (-3.61) (-1.47) (-3.18) (-3.16) (-2.02) (-1.49) (-3.10) (-2.53) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0319** 0.0266     0.0299* 0.0247     0.0303* 0.0250 
      (1.97) (1.63)     (1.84) (1.51)     (1.86) (1.52) 
                          
Observations 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1557 0.2229 0.2382 0.3028 0.1559 0.2233 0.2387 0.3034 0.1549 0.2221 0.2322 0.2967 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents regression results of the difference-in-difference research design on the effect of peer disclosures on a firm’s disclosure of its own clinical trial results, as well as the timeliness of its disclosure. 
The exogenous disclosure events are Novartis’s disclosures of a batch of more than five clinical trial results per day on December 14, December 20, 2010, and July 22, 2011. Firm- and trial-level control variables 
are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but 
is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The 
same applies to columns (3) to (12). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Proprietary Costs of Clinical Trial Disclosure 
Panel A: Peer clinical trials with complete vs. incomplete results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
          
Peer Disclosures with Complete Results -0.0318*** -0.0296*** -0.0541*** -0.0426*** 
  (-3.40) (-3.08) (-4.56) (-3.51) 
Peer Disclosures with Incomplete Results 0.0083 0.0152 0.0147 0.0163 
  (0.82) (1.45) (1.12) (1.22) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0351** 0.0296* 
      (2.15) (1.80) 
          
Observations 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1549 0.2216 0.2302 0.2941 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
P-value for F-test 0.0175** 0.0096*** 0.0013*** 0.0072*** 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents regression results on the effect of peers’ past disclosures of complete results vs. incomplete results on the firm’s own disclosure decisions. Firm- and trial-level control variables 
are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not 
reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the 
regression. The same applies to columns (3) and (4). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Peer clinical trials in late vs. early phase  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
          
Peer Disclosures Late Stage -0.0333*** -0.0407*** -0.0400*** -0.0325*** 
  (-4.04) (-4.69) (-3.66) (-2.90) 
Peer Disclosures Early Stage 0.0035 0.0186** -0.0220** -0.0135 
  (0.41) (2.10) (-1.99) (-1.20) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0345** 0.0289* 
      (2.12) (1.76) 
          
Observations 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1558 0.2239 0.2315 0.2946 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
P-value for F-test 0.0067*** 0.0000*** 0.3195 0.3052 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents regression results on the effect of peers’ past disclosures of late-stage vs. early-stage clinical trial results on the firm’s own disclosure decisions. Firm- and trial-level control 
variables are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. 
Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1) because singleton observations are dropped when both year 
and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (3) and (4). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel C: Competition measured by Normalized HHI  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
          
Low Normalized Trial HHI 0.0354 0.0475 0.1205*** 0.0947** 
  (1.04) (1.37) (2.87) (2.28) 
Peer Disclosures -0.0109 -0.0023 0.0052 0.0048 
  (-1.34) (-0.27) (0.48) (0.43) 
Peer Disclosures X Low Normalized Trial HHI -0.0235* -0.0231* -0.0633*** -0.0507*** 
  (-1.95) (-1.88) (-4.15) (-3.28) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0327** 0.0284* 
      (2.01) (1.73) 
          
Observations 5,297 5,204 2,970 2,920 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1554 0.2213 0.2328 0.2957 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional tests investigating the moderator effects of proprietary cost of disclosures, measured by Normalized HHI, on the association between peer disclosures 
and the firm’s own disclosure decisions. A low value of Normalized HHI indicates a high level of competition, which indicates high proprietary cost of disclosure. Low Normalized Trial HHI is 
equal to one if the trial Normalized Trial HHI is below the median, and zero otherwise. Firm- and trial-level control variables are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the 
Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial 
level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The 
sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to 
columns (3) and (4).  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Cross-Sectional Tests on Peer and Own Market Reaction to Peer Disclosures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
          
Peer Disclosures -0.0389*** -0.0309*** -0.0688*** -0.0521*** 
  (-3.57) (-2.72) (-4.93) (-3.64) 
Past Bad Market News -0.0942** -0.0778 -0.1012* -0.0653 
  (-2.01) (-1.62) (-1.76) (-1.15) 
Peer Disclosures X Past Bad Market News 0.0383** 0.0323** 0.0395** 0.0302 
  (2.40) (1.97) (1.98) (1.52) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)     0.0232 0.0197 
      (1.29) (1.08) 
          
Observations 4,358 4,278 2,438 2,395 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1555 0.2209 0.2299 0.2859 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
This table presents the results based on the nature of news (3-day-window market reaction) for peers and firms themselves when peers disclose clinical trial results with the same medical condition. 
Firm- and trial-level control variables are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in 
probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in column (2) is different from that in column (1) because singleton observations 
are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to columns (3) and (4). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Controlling for Peer and Own Market Reaction to Peer Disclosures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Timely Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
Timely 
Disclosure 
              
Peer Disclosures -0.0269*** -0.0212** -0.0289** -0.0582*** -0.0439*** -0.0734*** 
  (-2.70) (-2.04) (-2.54) (-4.56) (-3.36) (-4.53) 
Current Own CAR (-1,+1)       0.0223 0.0191 0.0251 
        (1.24) (1.05) (1.13) 
Past Peers' CAR (-1,+1) of Peers' Disclosures -0.0278* -0.0114 -0.0332** 0.0282 0.0351* 0.0388* 
  (-1.91) (-0.77) (-1.99) (1.52) (1.85) (1.69) 
Past Own CAR (-1,+1) of Peers' Disclosures 0.0448*** 0.0276* 0.0530*** -0.0065 -0.0072 -0.0137 
  (3.17) (1.93) (3.28) (-0.36) (-0.39) (-0.62) 
              
Observations 4,358 4,278 4,358 2,438 2,395 2,438 
Adj. R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.1568 0.2208 0.1275 0.2295 0.2862 0.1944 
Area under ROC curve     0.7341     0.7867 
Firm-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trial-level control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Model OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
This panel presents the robustness tests on whether and when a firm discloses clinical trial results after we control for past average peer market reaction CAR (-1, +1) around peer disclosures and 
past average own market reaction CAR (-1, +1) around peer disclosures. Firm- and trial-level control variables are the same as those in the main tests in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix A 
for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the trial level. Marginal 
effects are shown in probit models, and the area under the ROC curve in probit models is also provided. Constant is included in OLS models but is not reported for brevity. The sample size in 
column (2) is different from that in columns (1) and (3) because singleton observations are dropped when both year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The same applies to 
columns (4) to (6). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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